a description of the standard Bayesian approach to rea soning about uncertainty and the major critiques it faces. The paper then lays the theoretical groundwork.
for the causal extension of the Bayesian approach, and details specific improvements we have developed. The paper then goes on to describe our knowledge engineer ing and implementation and the results of a test of the system. The paper concludes with a discussion of how the causal Bayesian approach deals with the criticisms of the standard Bayesian model and why it is superior to alternative approaches to reasoning about uncertainty popular in the AI community.
I�TRODCCTION AND OVERVIEW
Medical diagnosis is one of the major foci of work on reasoning about uncertainty in artificial intelli gence. It is the problem of how optimally to combine evidence from outwardly visible patient symptoms and signs to make the best inference about underlying or invisible disease causes, by using expert knowledge of the relative strengths of the links between causes and effects. The situation is complicated because each cause has multiple effects and several causes may pro duce the same effect Also, certain effects are highly intercorrelated, so that treating them as independent may lead to diagnostic errors. Finally, the utility of treat ment decisions varies among possible diseases, so that the most rational treatment decision does not necessarily treat the most probable disease. Effective methods of diagnosis should provide enough information to allow the best treatment choice for a given patient.
It may take a physician a lifetime to develop advanced diagnostic expertise in a particular medical specialty. Expert diagnosticians perform well because they have learned much about the placement and strengths of the links between causes and effects in the disease process (Clarke, 1982; Elstein, Shulman, & Sprafka, 1978) . However, this does not imply that they have a superior calculus or set of production rules for reasoning about uncertainty. A large body of psycho logical research (recent reviews are Baron, 1985; Kahneman, Slavic, & Tversky, 1982; Nisbett & Ross, 1980) suggests that people reason about uncertainty using simplifying heuristics and strategies, which com monly lead to biased judgements. Physicians, as peo ple, are subject to the same reasoning biases (Berwick, Fineberg, & Weinstein, 1981; Christensen-Szalanski & Bushyhead, 1981; Detmer, Fryback, & Gassner, 1978; Eddy, 1982) .
If a physician's probabilistic knowledge is extracted and combined using a normative calculus, it can result in a diagnostic accuracy better than that of the physician (Clarke, 1984) .
(This "bootstrapping" phenomenon has a long tradition in psychology, see, for example, Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971). Our goal as applied scientists, in designing an expert system, should be to use our best theories about normative reasoning to design an inference engine, which can be combined with a knowledge base obtained from an expert who has extended experience observing a domain. The purpose of this paper is:
1)
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to show why we think the causal Bayesian approach provides the most normative basis for an inference engine for reasoning about uncer tainty .
2) to give an example of an implementation.
ST Aj\:DARD BAYESIAN ASSUMPTIONS AND
CRITIQUES
Bayes theorem provides a good starting point for the design of an ideal inference engine because it has a firm foundation in the axioms of subjective probability (Savage, 1954) . The standard form of Bayes theorem calculates the conditional probability of a cause (disease) given effects (symptoms) in terms of the pro babilities of the diseases (priors) and the probabilities of the symptoms given the diseases (likelihoods). The for mula, as applied to a single symptom, is as follows:
Here the D's refer to diseases, s is a particular symp tom, and D i is the disease of interest.
The formula becomes more complicated for the conditional probability of a disease given more than one symptom. For example, the equation to find the poste rior probability of disease Di when symptom St is added to the k-1 known symptoms is:
This means that to build a complete Bayesian system containing k symptoms and n diseases, it would be necessary to store likelihoods of each symptom given all combinations of from one to k-l other symptoms with each of the n diseases. Therefore, traditional Bayesian diagnostic systems of suffi cient scope to be useful in multiple disease situations are quite often difficult to implement, as has been repeatedly pointed out in reviews of the literature on computer-based diagnostic systems (Charniak & McDermott, 1985; Hayes-Roth, Waterman, & Lenat, 1983; Kleinmuntz, 1984; Schaffner, 1981).
2.1.
ASSUMPTION OF SYMPTOM INDEPEN·
DENCE
The practicality of Bayesian systems can be improved by assuming symptom independence, thereby reducing the size of the set of symptom likelihoods that need to be known beforehand. Symptom independence is expressed through the following two assumptions:
The first says that the probability of observing symptom s; in the subpopulation of individuals with symptom si is the same as the probability of observing symptom si in the whole universe. The second says that the proba bility of observing symptom s; in the subpopulation of individuals with disease. D and symptom si is the same as the probability of observing symptom s; among all individuals with disease D. The upshot is these assumptions is that it is necessary to store likelihoods of only individual symptoms given diseases because the likelihood of two or more symptoms occurring together given a disease can be obtained by multiplying the indi vidual likelihoods as follows:
The justification for these independence assump tions is questionable. Although the medical AI litera ture reports examples of independence-assuming Baye sian medical systems (reviewed in deDombal, 1979;
Wardle & Wardle, 197&) having diagnostic accuracies of over 90%, it is apparent that symptoms are not usu ally independent of each other in the real world, because the probability of two symptoms of the same disease occurring together, given that one has the disease, is often much higher than the product of the individual probabilities of the symptoms. If someone has a headache, knowing that it was caused by a cold makes a simultaneous sore throat more likely. Monte Carlo studies by Russek, Kronmal, and Fisher (1983) imply that the assumption of symptom independence does not change the rank ordering of diseases, but it does effect the posterior probability distribution, so that the probabilities of diseases with p's over 0.5 are overestimated, and those with p's under 0.5 are underes timated. This would not be problematic for most com puter medical diagnostic systems that just come up with lists of likely diseases, but has serious implications if one is trying to perform patient management by weight ing utilities with accurate disease probabilities to find an optimum treatment. 
CAUSES
In Bayes theorem causes of effects are held to be mutually exclusive. Each cause is assigned a prior pro bability or degree of belief, and when evidence is presented the degree of belief in a cause is incremented or decremented based on the ability of that cause to uniquely account for that evidence. When applied in The symptoms of gastrointestinal disturbance, anorexia and nausea, cannot appear until appendicitis has produced the disturbance, but after iL is present, one or both symptoms may occur, relatively independently of the other. This is modeled by assuming that symp toms are independent with respect to proximal causes, which can be expressed computationally as follows: In our implementation a disease is represented by a hierarchical graph of a tree, expanding downwards, with the top node representing the disease, middle nodes representing pathstates, and bottom nodes representing symptoms. Figure 2 shows the representation we used for appendicitis. Links between nodes, which are only in a vertical direction, represent the probability of an child node being caused by its direct parent All the child nodes which are direct descendants of the same parent �e treated as probabilistically independent with respect to that parent 
THE KNOWLEDGE ENGINEERING
We started the project by locating an expert not able both for his medical knowledge and his sym pathetic attitude towards attempts to quantify the medi cal decision-making process. We decided to work on the problem of the differential diagnosis of appendicitis because it was circumscribed, had hard data available, and the large differences in utilities for the possible treatment options would put a premium on the correct assessment of disease probabilities. The first author spent several weeks reading the literature of the domain, and after extended discussion we chose to limit the modeling process to the six diseases with prior probabil ities higher than one percent that would be considered when diagnosing appendicitis. The final model also included 19 symptoms and 32 intermediate pathstates.
(The hierarchical structures of the diseases were defined in PROLOG by the first author.)
We developed the pathstate structure for the vari ous diseases by deciding which symptoms were causally related because they all were manifestations of a stress produced by the disease on a particular system, or organ, or at a particular location. In general, similar symptoms were interrelated in the same way for different diseases, simplifying the modeling process.
Although the diseases that are commonly con fused with appendicitis may cause the same symptoms with the same probabilities, they can be diagnostically differentiated because they characteristically produce these symptoms at different times after the onset of the disease. Therefore, we needed to modify the pathstate models to allow diseases to evolve over time. We solved this problem by making the likelihood links between nodes conditional on the time since disease onset. This was done by having the expert graph the probability strength of each link as a function of time, from 0 to 132 hours. Even though drawing a line on a graph does not create a much larger time demand on the expert than making a point estimate, it provides much more information. In this way, we could generate likel ihoods for symptoms being produced by the various diseases at whatever time since onset that the symptoms were reported. (Time since disease onset was defined as time since first observed symptom.)
Pathstates emerge from the expert's causal under standing of the disease process, but there is no indepen dent evidence of their existence. As scientists, we include them as hypothetical constructs in our models because they improve the quality of our explanations and predictions. However we were posing our expert the difficult question of assigning probabilities to the likelihood of diseases causing theoretical entities or the theoretical entities causing symptoms. To reassure our selves that he wasn't pulling these numbers from a hat, we devised a coherency check. We asked our expert to graph the direct likelihood of each symptom given appendicitis. These likelihoods should be both more reliable and better calibrated, because they are based on the empirical observation of symptoms and are con sistent with the way our expert is used to thinking about diseases. We could then compare these likelihoods with the likelihood of a symptom given a disease obtained from the model and correct the discrepancies. (The model defines the likelihood of a symptom given a disease as equal to the products of the likehoods linking all the nodes on a direct path from the symptom to the disease.) There was substantial overlap, although the model estimates tended to be lower than the direct ones (perhaps because the expert underestimated the effect of multiplying several likelihoods less than one when pro _viding the original pathstate probabilities).
The knowledge engineering also involved obtain ing estimates for disease priors and treatment utilities from our expert. We found the priors to be conditional upon age and sex, so we repeated the technique of hav ing the expert draw graphs to show the change in disease probability with age. Some of the prior proba bilities of the gynecological diseases also varied accord ing to time of the month, so we also made a graph of these changes and used them to weight the age-based priors. (Afterwards, the prior probabilities across diseases were normalized.) Entering treatment utilities involved the related problems of finding one standard to measure utility and defining the treatment options. The �ventual options used were symptomatic treatment until recovery or an intraperitoneal operation (symptomatic treatment implies that an operation may be performed if the patient's condition declines). Utility was estimated in terms of morbidity, specifically, number of days in the hospital expected for a particular disease-treatment combination (mortality was not used as a measure of utility, because it is typically below one percent for all cases).
IMPLEMENTING THE MODEL
The rest of this section describes several compli cations that emerged when we tried to implement the model and the solutions we arri ved at to resolve them. 
COMPENSATING FOR SINGLE CAUSES OF SYMPTOMS
Another serious problem to emerge was that not all symptoms we were looking at were caused by all the diseases in the hypothesis pool. Theoretically, the observation of a symptom uniquely caused by one of the diseases should categorically rule out the others. No doctor would perform a diagnosis on this basis. We might try to deal with this problem by relaxing the con dition that diseases be mutually exclusive and by adding other diseases thought to cause the symptoms, e.g., colds. We resisted this approach. It seemed reasonable to consider our six diseases to be mutually exclusive for the practical purpose of differentially diagnosing appen dicitis. Although any one of the symptoms we were considering might be caused by many different diseases, the co-occurrence of several of these symptoms in the patient would strongly suggest that the relevant disease was from the pool. And since the pool was so small, we felt that the chance of two diseases from within it occurring simultaneously to cause acute symptoms to be vanishingly small.
The solution was to allow the possibility that symptoms could be independently caused by individual diseases from outside the pool and were co-occurring 233 with the diseases from within it. Accordingly, we had our expert graph a "base-rate" external-cause probability for each symptom by sex and age. The numerator of Bayes theorem would now become:
i.e., the prior probability of the disease times the likeli hood of the symptoms caused by the disease having a particular set of values, given the disease, times the independent probability of each symptom not caused by There are two ways that "base-rate" symptoms could co-occur with the diseases of the hypothesis pool and their symptoms, as shown in Figure 3 . The entire upper rectangle in Figure 3 represents the probability of Disease A, and the entire lower rectangle represents the probability of Disease B. Disease B causes a symptom with a certain likelihood, represented by the lower half of Disease B, while Disease A does not cause it. There is also a certain probability of this symptom co occurring independently with each disease from outside causes, represented by the small vertical rectangles on the left sides of A and B. The probability of this symp tom given Disease A is simply equal to the symptom's overall "base-rate" probability, because Disease A and the symptom are independent. The probability of the symptom given Disease B involves two contributions, one from inside the disease and one from outside it. B ecause they are independent contributions, the wtal probability of the symptom given Disease B is equal to the probability of the symptom being caused by the disease, plus the probability of its being caused exter nally, minus the overlap.
The same principle can be extended for each symptom that either is caused or not caused by a partic ular disease. However, for a symptom to be caused by a disease, there is a long causal chain to follow, any of whose links could break. In other words, a symptom could be absent just as easily from a paths tate not being caused by a disease as from a symptom not being caused by a pathstate. Conversely, any time there is a break in the causal chain, there is some probability that a given symptom could be independently caused. Therefore the revised ''lhood" function should include a probability for an independent symptom to be observed given all possible outcomes for the causal chain, either being intact or breaking at any given link. It is as fol lows:
If (x is a s y mptom node)
Here p (zt ) is the externally caused probability of a symptom descendant of node Y i having a value of present, absent, or unknown. The "base-rate" probabil ity assigned for a symptom Zt being absent is one minus the probability p (zt) of that symptom being present, and the value assigned for unknown status is one (so that the product in the numerator of Bayes theorem depends only on known symptoms). The term on the left side of the definition of "!hood" for disease and pathstate nodes remains unchanged from the previ ous definition. The term on the right side represents the probability of the set of descendant symptoms being observed in the absence of node Yi being caused.
COMBil\1NG INFORMATION FROM TWO MEASUREMENTS
TESTING THE MODEL
We tested the ability of the model to distinguish the symptoms of 100 recorded cases of appendicitis from those of 100 recorded cases of nonspecific abdom inal pain. The cases were chosen to present a wide range of diagnostic difficulty, with some causing high probabilities of error for human diagnosticians and pre vious (Bayesian) diagnostic systems. For the test, we constructed a comparison independent Bayesian model which had the same likelihoods for individual symptoms being caused by a disease, but in which the probabilities of combinations of symptoms given a disease were obtained by multiplying their separate likelihoods, as in Figure 1(b) . The probabilities of individual symptoms for the independent model were found by multiplying all the likehoods linking all the nodes on a direct path from the symptom to the disease in the pathstate model. This would provide a fair comparison; any difference in the performance of the models could not be attributed to tlte accuracy of the likelihoods of individual symptoms and must therefore depend on how tlte data about symp toms were combined.
To accurately describe the test sample, we set the prior probabilities of appendicitis and non-specific abdominal pain to 0.5 in both models. We entered the symptoms of the cases into both models and obtained posterior probabilities of appendicitis for each case. An appropriate measure of performance is calibration, also known as "reliability in the small" (Yeats, 1982) . A person or decision-system is well calibrated if the pro bability she or it assigns to a given outcome occurs that with that frequency; for example, if 9 out of 10 abdomi nal cases that were assigned a 90% probability of of being appendicitis actually were appendicitis. (We are more interested in calibration than in maximizing discrimination between appendicitis and non appendicitis because good calibration allows maximum accuracy in placing diseases above or below the proba bility threshold for switching treatment options based on utility considerations. This threshold is rarel y 0.5).
The result, obtained using the jackknife statistical technique (Mosteller & Tukey, 1977) , was that the cali bration of the causal Bayesian model (.0735) was supe rior to the independent model (.0785). The probability of this difference being due to chance was <.001. An alternative comparison using a measure of the area of error between a quadratic regression function fitted on the probabilities of the cases assigned by a particular model and the perfect calibration function also showed the causal model to be signifi cantly superior. The results suggest that the causal Bayesian approach can provide a viable solution to tlte interdependence prob lem.
These tests are described in more detail in Schwartz, Clarke, Baron, & deDombal (1986) . A test of a conceptually similar causal Bayesian model which used objective probabilities to define the links between pathstates, but which did not allow for outside causes of symptoms", also showed a considerable improvement in calibration over an independent comparison model (Clarke, Schwartz, Baron, & deDombal, 1986) .
WORK IN PROGRESS
Another problem that we have been considering is how to take advantage of symptom information from two different times. For example, a doctor learns about a first set of symptoms; noticed by the patient when he contracts a disease, and a second set of symptoms when the patient is examined. Between the two measure ments, symptom values may change in either direction. Given that one has a model of how various diseases evolve over time, these changing symptoms should be very diagnostic in distinguishing among diseases.
Suppose the likelihood of a symptom given a disease increases over time. Four symptom patterns may be observed: yes-yes, yes-no, no-yes, or no-no. The two temporal measurements are not independent, because they refl ect the operation of a single disease process. Probabilities may be assigned to these patterns by assuming a relationship of implication between likel ihoods. If a symptom is caused by a disease at a time when it is less likely to do so, then we must also expect it to occur when it is more likely. However, a symptom imply that it will occur when it is less likely. There fore, the probability of the yes-yes pattern may be defined as probability of the symptom at the less likely time.
The yes-no pattern, with a symptom being observed at the less likely, but not more likely, time, is impossible and could only be produced by some outside cause. The no-yes pattern, with the symptom being observed only at the more likely time, has a probability equal to the difference between the likelihoods of the symptom at the more and less likely times. The proba bility of the no-no pattern is equal to one minus the likelihood of the symptom being caused at the more likely time.
This logic can easily be extended to describe the temporal changes in the likelihood of any child node given its parent. A parallel representation describes how the four patterns can be accounted for by indepen dently caused symptoms. Work is proceeding to com plete the implementation of these additions and test
them.
At the same time, the first author is using the causal pathstate model of appendicitis described in the previous sections of this paper to compare the diagnos tic reasoning of expen and novice surgeons, as pan of his doctoral dissertation in Psychology at the University of Pennsylvania.
CONCLUSIONS
There are several conclusions we would like to draw about the work we have described. We have tried to show that a Bayesian diagnostic system using subj ec tive causal links between intermediate states is feasible .
Above that, the calibration results show that causal modeling is consequential, that is, it visibly improves performance over a Bayesian system based on the con ventional assumption of symptom i ndependence. Once again, the lesson of Artificial Intelligence research is that a simple theoretical analysis of a problem does not reveal all the difficulties that arise during implem enta tion. We have found additional difficulties, not foreseen by Chamiak (1983) , specifi cally:
1)
that symptoms take on different meanings because diseases evolve over time.
2)
that symptoms can be indirectly related, because they reveal different levels of severity of a patho logical condition.
3) that not all the diseases in an hypothesis pool cause the same symptoms, so that it is necessary to allow symptoms to have external causes.
Fortunately, these problems are soluble.
The main advantage of this approach that we would like to emphasize is that unlike the current "hot" approaches for dealing with uncertainty in AI, MYCIN's certainty factors and Dempster-Shafer (Buchanan & Shonliffe, 1984; Shafer, 1976; Shontiffe, 1976) , the output of this system is real probabilities that
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can be used to weigh the utilities of teatment options for patient management. Other advanteges are that it solves the interdependence problem in a palatable way, is com put ationally simple, and does not place an excessive demand for probability estimates on the expert. Given the theoretical justification for the Bayesian approach,
there now seems to be no further excuse for neglecting it in the design of expen systems.
